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INTRODUCTION
With technology evolving at a dizzying pace and providing new
opportunities to connect with others, the United States government has tried to
stay ahead of Internet copyright infringers. Of particular frustration to the
government are websites such as Rojadirecta1 and myVidster.2 These sites,
among many others, provide Internet users with the ability to stream
unauthorized, copyrighted video from third parties directly to their computers.
Seeking to take down the domains of these websites, the government withholds
the site from any functionality. But many of these pending cases have been
dismissed before the courts could decide on the claims’ substantive merits.
Assuming that these third-party linking websites would have otherwise met the
threshold to be found liable for copyright infringement, each might possess a
defense against their charges through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), specifically through its “safe harbor” exemptions in § 512.3 While
the bulk of legal discussion on safe harbor defenses deals with the first three
parts of § 512, the fourth—less invoked part of limitations on liability relating
to material online—specifically provides an exemption for “information
location tools,” provided they meet certain criteria.4
This Comment will discuss the potential use of § 512(d) of the DMCA in
connection with third-party video streaming websites, particularly the recent
government seizures in Rojadirecta and litigation in myVidster. First, the
Comment will examine § 512(d) of the DMCA, the various elements that
comprise the section, and the legislative intent behind its drafting. Second, the
Comment will focus directly on the actual knowledge requirement within §
512(d)(1), and, in the absence of actual knowledge, the similarities in “red flag”
knowledge to patent knowledge requirements. Finally, it will address the state
of case law regarding websites such as Rojadirecta and myVidster, and analyze
whether third-party linking websites such as these can legitimately claim to be
information location tools or whether this section provides too much latitude
for copyright infringers.
I. THE LAW AND HISTORY OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS
A. Internet Service Provider Definitions and Liability
Two definitions exist within the Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512
that define who qualifies as a “service provider” eligible for one of the safe
1.
2.
3.
4.

ROJADIRECTA, http://www.rojadirecta.me/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
MYVIDSTER, http://www.myvidster.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
See id. § 512(d).
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harbor exemptions. The first is limited to § 512(a) and protects transitory
digital network communications.5 In § 512(k)(1)(A), a service provider is
defined as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to
the content of the material sent or received.”6 This definition provides the
working framework for the remaining three safe harbor exemptions. More
broadly defined, a service provider is “a provider of online services or network
services, or the operator of facilities thereof.”7 This broader definition
encompasses “services such as search engines, websites (including retail sites),
hosting services, bulletin board and newsgroup operators.”8
Tension also exists between the various liabilities for these service
providers. Traditionally, three distinct types of liability can be attached to
copyright infringers: direct, contributory, and vicarious. Direct infringement
occurs when “[a]nyone . . . violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.”9 The individual who violates those rights is directly liable for the
infringement. But for a variety of reasons, litigation of direct infringers is not
as common as it is for secondary infringers, the intermediaries.10 Individuals
or service providers who assist in direct infringement can be held contributorily
or vicariously liable. Contributory infringement occurs when “[o]ne who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another.”11 Vicarious liability occurs when “the
defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to
supervise the direct infringer.”12 These distinct forms of common law liability,
which will be covered in further detail later in the Comment, “continue to exist
as before, unaffected by the DMCA.”13
5. See id. § 512(a).
6. Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
7. Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
8. 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT Chap. 21, § 21:85 (2013) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., CoStar, Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
2004).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
10. See generally BRUCE E. BOYDEN, INTERNET LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 788 (2012)
(“While the Internet and other digital technologies have expanded the ability of individuals to copy
and distribute, they have not enhanced the ability to bring lawsuits against individuals. . . . Suing
hundreds or thousands of individuals for myriad separate direct infringement actions is difficult and
expensive.”).
11. Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gershwin
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
12. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005).
13. 6 PATRY, supra note 8.
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There does, however, exist some difference between the copyright
infringement liability and common law causes of action.14 If a service provider
does not qualify for one of the safe harbor exemptions, it may instead argue that
the copyright holder “has failed to make out a common law cause of action for
contributory infringement or vicarious liability.”15
Additionally, a distinction exists between criminal and civil copyright
infringement. While this Comment does not address criminal copyright
infringement,16 it is pleaded in the Rojadirecta case referenced in Section III(A).
In short, “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a copyright . . . for purposes of
commercial advantage”17 is criminally liable for copyright infringement.
Additional provisions in § 506 account for the “reproduction or distribution . . .
of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which
have a total retail value of more than $1,000”18 and the distribution of work
“being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a
computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or
should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.”19
But perhaps the most important distinction for the purposes of this Comment is
that there is no secondary criminal copyright infringement. Only direct
infringers are held criminally liable.
B. Text of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is divided into several specific
limitations on liability relating to material online. Those who satisfy the
elements for one of the safe harbor defenses are shielded from an award of
monetary damages and often from injunctive relief.20 Each exemption
functions independent of each other. Failure to qualify for one exemption will
not bar the party from asserting another exemption. § 512(a) addresses
“transitory digital network communications.”21 It specifically covers service
providers that act as conduits for the transmission of copyrighted work without
modification.22 The section allows for “a broad grant of immunity to service
14. See id.
15. Id. (The reverse is not true however. If a service provider satisfies one of the safe harbor
exemptions, the copyright owner cannot also make the provider liable for common law infringement).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
17. Id. § 506(a)(1)(A).
18. Id. § 506(a)(1)(B).
19. Id. § 506(a)(1)(C).
20. See id. § 512(j). This immunity helps protect ISPs from fear of incurring undue liability
that would strain or halt normal operation of doing business. Additionally, it can hold off mounting
costs of litigation.
21. Id. § 512(a).
22. See id.
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providers whose connection with the material is transient.”23 The Internet
service provider (ISP) cannot actively select the recipients24 or the material to
be transmitted,25 or it risks losing immunity. The computers pass along the
transient information among users, and if these intervening computers must
block indirectly infringing material, “[t]he Internet as we know it simply cannot
exist.”26 This exemption is relatively straightforward and easy to identify,
especially in comparison to both § 512(c) and § 512(d).
§ 512(b) protects against system caching, or the creation of temporary
copies of copyrighted work for quick network archival access.27 Quick access
to these files allows for ISPs to prevent excessive network congestion and can
be vital to the network’s continued performance. Indeed, § 512(b) takes into
account just how the Internet functions. To avoid uninterrupted transmission,
caching “reduces waiting time, and . . . service provider bandwidth loads” by
sending the temporary or cached copy to the destination point instead of
retrieving it from the original source again.28
§ 512(c), one of the more litigated sections within § 512, protects ISPs from
liability when information residing on systems or networks at the direction of a
third-party user is infringing.29 Websites such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter,
and Flickr (among many others) allow users to store these copyrighted
materials in such a manner where they are made publicly available, or at least
amongst a select group of individuals that the user approves. Pivotal to this
third section’s limit on liability is a knowledge section that, for all purposes,
functions nearly identical to the knowledge section in § 512(d).
The final limit on liability in § 512 and the primary focus of this Comment
is § 512(d), information location tools.30 Information location tools can include
directories, hypertext links, pointers, and other vital means of communicating
online.31 Further, section (d) states that a service provider will not be found
liable “for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or
23. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (The court continued
explaining its definition of “transient” communication: “When an individual clicks on an Internet link,
his computer sends a request for the information. The company receiving that request sends that
request on to another computer, which sends it on to another. . . . In passing the information along,
each intervening computer makes a short-lived copy of the data.”).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3) (2006).
25. Id. § 512(a)(1).
26. Perfect 10, Inc., 488 F.3d at 1116 (“Service providers are immune for transmitting all digital
online communications, not just those that directly infringe.”).
27. § 512(b).
28. 6 PATRY, supra note 8.
29. § 512(c).
30. Id. § 512(d).
31. See id. § 512(d).
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linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing
activity.”32 In order to obtain the immunity, the ISP must not receive any
financial benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity,” when the ISP
has the “right and ability to control” the activity.33 In all cases where the ISP
has been notified of claimed infringement, the ISP must respond “expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to” the infringing material.34
But the immunity is also conditioned on satisfaction of three knowledge
factors. The ISP must not have “actual knowledge that the material or activity
is infringing.”35 Second, in the absence of actual knowledge, the ISP must not
“be aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent.”36 Finally, the ISP must, upon “obtaining such knowledge or
awareness, act expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”37
Section II of this Comment, together with a deeper discussion of the legislative
and procedural history of § 512(d), will more closely examine how the “actual
knowledge” requirement is defined.
C. Legislative History of § 512(d)
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and by extension § 512’s safe
harbor exemptions, came in response to several external stimuli. The first was
the further implementation of World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) sponsored copyright agreements, an extension of the United States’
recent adherence to the Berne Convention.38 The second, arguably more
pressing, stimulus was the changing nature of the Internet and digital
environments, making the reproduction of copyrighted works easier and more
efficient than ever.39 Indeed, users of the Internet or other electronic media can
now “send and retrieve perfect reproductions of copyrighted material easily and
nearly instantaneously, to or from locations around the world.”40 While the
advances in technology would undoubtedly benefit copyright owners and
consumers, it would also “facilitate pirates who aim to destroy the value of
American intellectual property.”41 To address these concerns, WIPO hosted a
32. Id. § 512(d).
33. Id. § 512(d)(2). This is a particularly difficult provision to interpret, similar to one in §
512(c). It creates confusion because of its conflicting connections with common law liability. It will
be handled in more depth in Section II.
34. Id. § 512(d)(3).
35. Id. § 512(d)(1)(A).
36. Id. § 512(d)(1)(B).
37. Id. § 512(d)(1)(C).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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conference in December 1996 to create two treaties adopted by consensus by
over 150 countries: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty.42
Specific to this Comment, the second part of House Report 105 addresses
Internet copyright infringement liability in Title II of the DMCA.43 One of the
primary concerns in drafting Title II was to “[preserve] strong incentives for
service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked
environment.”44 Of equal concern was the desire to create “greater certainty to
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may
occur in the course of their activities.”45 By striking a balance between the oft
competing interests of the copyright owners, ISPs, and third-party consumers,
Congress hoped § 512 of the DMCA would have enough teeth to protect
copyright owners, without sacrificing either freedom of speech or the
predictability of liability for ISPs.
To that end, the adopted § 512(d) covers situations where “information
location tools refer or link users to an on-line location containing infringing
material or infringing activity.”46 Congress also defined in their House Report
that the term “infringing activity” would represent “wrongful activity that is
occurring at the location to which the users linked or referred by the information
location tool.”47 But this definition holds true whether the infringement “is
technically deemed to have occurred at that location or at the location where
the material is received.”48 Additionally, Congress included a list of valid
information location tools that would satisfy § 512(d):
[A] directory or index of on-line sites or material, such as a search
engine that identifies pages by specified criteria; a reference to outside
material, such as a list of recommended sites; a pointer that stands for
an Internet location or address; and hypertext links, which allows users
to access material without entering its address.49
The Report goes on to explain that the § 512(d) safe harbor would restrict

42. Id. See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 49–50.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 56–57.
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the liability of an ISP that “refers or links users to an on-line location containing
infringing material or activity” by using information location tools.50 While the
knowledge component of § 512(d) will be addressed more thoroughly in the
next section of the Comment, Congress identified concerns raised by ISPs that
they may be “disqualified from the safe harbor based solely on evidence that it
had viewed the infringing Internet site.”51 The fear became that websites with
human editors would expose themselves to undue liability unintentionally. If
there existed a cooling effect on edited information location tools because of
the exposure to liability, online directories that assisted Internet users in
identifying and locating information on the Internet would be permanently
impacted.52 The solution to this concern resides with the actual knowledge
component in both § 512(c) and § 512(d).
II. ACTUAL AND RED FLAG KNOWLEDGE
A. Actual Knowledge
Most of the focus on “actual knowledge” in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s DMCA § 512 safe harbor provisions stems from § 512(c).53 §
512(c) is fundamentally very similar in evaluating the component of actual
knowledge to § 512(d). In fact, sections (c) and (d) vary only superficially
when discussing what constitutes actual knowledge. Courts generally presume
that “similar statutes should be interpreted similarly,” with the similarity of the
language being the determinative factor in evaluating the similar statutes.54
Each safe harbor provision is divided into three subsections. The first
subsection of each requires that the ISP not possess actual knowledge of the
infringing material.55 The only change between the two merely differentiates
where the infringing work is held. The identical second subsections of both (c)
and (d) address whether an ISP, in the absence of actual knowledge, may be
otherwise aware of infringing activities.56 The final subsections of (c) and (d)
are also identical and provide for what an ISP should do once it has obtained

50. Id. at 57.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
54. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004)).
55. Compare § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (“does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing”), with § 512(d)(1)(A) (“does not have actual
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing”).
56. “[I]n the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.” § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B).
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actual knowledge or awareness of circumstances for infringement.57
§ 512 is not the most clearly written of copyright statutes. Courts have tried
tackling the actual knowledge components of §§ 512(c)–(d) and interpreting
the fine distinctions between them. As previously mentioned, most case law
centers on § 512(c), but because of their similarity in structure, courts have
applied the same interpretations to the language of both sections. In A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that “specific infringing
material” that the operator failed to remove could constitute infringement.58
But “absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a
computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement” just
for the inherent structure of the computer system.59
One of the most recent high profile cases involving the safe harbor
provisions is Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.60 Plaintiffs from Viacom, the
English Premier League, and various television and movie studios appealed a
summary judgment decision from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in favor of YouTube regarding an assortment
of direct and contributory copyright infringement claims.61
Specific to this Comment, the court examined the issue of actual
knowledge. The district court found that YouTube had received “insufficient
notice of the particular infringements”62 and lacked “actual knowledge” or
“aware [ness] of facts or circumstances”63 that would prevent an ISP from
claiming safe harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(A). But importantly, the
district court held that § 512(c)(1)(A) refers to “knowledge of specific and
identifiable infringements.”64 The Second Circuit affirmed this holding for
several reasons. First, knowledge by itself is not enough to remove the safe
harbor protection of § 512(c)–(d), provided the ISP acts to remove or disable
the material “expeditiously.”65 The court places an emphasis on the fact that
the expeditious activity is to “remove or disable ‘the material’ at issue.”66 The
defendants argue this interpretation neglects what is termed the “red flag”

57. “[U]pon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material.” § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); § 512(d)(1)(C).
58. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
59. Id. at 1021.
60. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
61. Id. at 25–26.
62. Id.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2006).
64. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 718 F. Supp. 2d. 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
65. See 676 F.3d at 30 (2d Cir. 2012); § 512(c)–(d).
66. 676 F.3d at 31.
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knowledge of § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) and § 512(d)(1)(B).67
B. Red Flag Knowledge and Its Patent Roots
Red flag knowledge arises out of facts and circumstances.68 In the Second
Circuit’s Viacom opinion, the plaintiffs tried to argue that the usage of the
phrase “facts or circumstances” was not intended by Congress to limit red flag
knowledge to one type of knowledge and thereby “[require] less specificity”
than actual knowledge.69 But this could not be further from reality. “[N]o court
has embraced the contrary proposition . . . that the red flag provision ‘requires
less specificity’ than the actual knowledge provision.”70
Much of red flag knowledge case law comes from patent law. In 2011, the
United States Supreme Court decided Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., a patent case revolving around a “cool-touch” deep fryer, but that also
addresses red flag knowledge.71 In the 1980’s, SEB invented and patented a
“cool-touch” deep fryer.72 But a U.S. competitor of SEB asked a Hong Kong
supplier, Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to “supply it with deep fryers meeting
certain specifications.”73 Pentalpha purchased a SEB fryer in Hong Kong, but,
because of its sale in a foreign market, the fryer did not have any U.S. patent
markings.74 Despite being directly copied from SEB’s design, Pentalpha had
an attorney complete a “right-to-use study.”75 Pentalpha went on to supply its
infringing design for sale in the United States, prompting the lawsuit.
The Supreme Court held that “deliberate indifference to a known risk” is
not an appropriate defense to infringement.76 Pentalpha “was indisputably
aware that its customers were selling its product in [the United States].”77
Pentalpha demonstrated “willful blindness” by making conscious steps “to
avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said
to have actually known the critical facts.”78 Indeed, the facts and circumstances
surrounding Pentalpha’s development of their fryer were subjective enough to
determine red flag knowledge of their infringement.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
SEB’s.”).
76.
77.
78.

See id.; see also § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B).
See generally § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); § 512(d)(1)(B).
676 F.3d at 32.
Id. at 32.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
See id. at 2063–64.
Id. at 2064.
See id.
Id. (“Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney that its design was copied directly from
Id. at 2068.
Id. at 2070.
Id. at 2070–71.
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C. Subjective vs. Objective: Actual vs. Red Flag Knowledge
Actual and red flag knowledge cannot and should not be viewed as “specific
and generalized knowledge”.79 Actual knowledge, as it appears in §
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 512(d)(1)(A) is commonly used to “denote subjective
Actual knowledge provisions, thus, require that the ISP
belief.”80
“subjectively” know of specific infringement.81 Like actual knowledge, red
flag knowledge must also be specific to individual instances of infringement.
But the red flag knowledge provisions require the ISP to be “subjectively aware
of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious
to a reasonable person.”82
The Second Circuit in Viacom acknowledges a relatively “limited body of
case law,” but nevertheless, finds support for its interpretation of the two
knowledge provisions.83 In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, the Ninth Circuit examined § 512(c) with a copyright infringement case
against Veoh Networks.84 As with the Viacom case, the court in Shelter Capital
held that actual knowledge required the same “specific knowledge of particular
infringing activity.”85 Similarly, the court relieves the burden of “determining
whether materials are actually illegal” on an ISP.86 The Viacom court also cites
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, stating that despite being aware of
infringing occurring at some level, there must be some “specific ‘red flag’
knowledge with respect to any particular link.”87
III. APPLYING § 512(D) TO THE ROJADIRECTA AND MYVIDSTER CASES
Courts continue to grapple with how best to apply the various exemptions
of § 512. While prominent cases such as Shelter Capital and Viacom have
helped shape the case law surrounding the safe harbor exemptions, many more
cases that could have implications on ISP immunity are either dismissed prior
to a decision on the merits or decided on other grounds. Two such recent cases
are the focus of the remainder of this Comment: the civil forfeiture of the

79. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
80. Id. (“[T]he belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to
defeat . . . actual knowledge.” (quoting U.S. v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir. 2011)).
81. 676 F.3d at 31.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011).
Veoh Networks is a video-hosting service not unlike YouTube.
85. Id. at 1037.
86. Id. at 1038 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007)).
87. 676 F.3d at 32 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Rojadirecta domain name and the myVidster litigation. By looking at these two
examples, the potential emerges that the knowledge components of § 512(d)
may be too easily satisfied and provide too much latitude for infringing ISPs to
obtain immunity.
A. The Rojadirecta Takedown
Rojadirecta is a website that is solely owned by the limited liability
company Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. (Puerto 80), based out of Arteixo, Spain.88
Puerto 80 is incorporated under the laws of Spain and owns both the
rojadirecta.org and rojadirecta.com domain names.89 Both websites were
registered with GoDaddy.com, Inc., a United States company located in
Scottsdale, Arizona.90 Puerto 80 also owns the domain name rojadirecta.me.91
The Rojadirecta site “hosts ‘forums’ in which users can post messages
concerning sports, politics, and other topics.”92 Rojadirecta proved to be
enormously popular. According to the web traffic metric service Alexa.com,
as of or about January 27, 2011, Rojadirecta.org was the 2,380th most popular
website in the world and the 119th most popular in Spain.93 Using the same
service, Rojadirecta.com was the 2,326th most popular website in the world and
the 109th most popular website in Spain.94 Additionally, between its .com and
.org domain names, Rojadirecta increased the number of monthly unique
visitors dramatically from February 2010 to November and December 2010.95
But more importantly, Rojadirecta is a “linking” website.96 The website
provides “links to daily live sporting events and Pay-Per-View events, as well
as downloadable broadcasts of sporting events or Pay-Per-View events that had
been previously aired.”97 The main homepage for Rojadirecta consists of
88. See Petition for Release of Seized Property, at 1, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U v. United States
(2011) (No. 13 Civ. 3983), available at https://www.eff.org/files/Petition%20for%20Release%20of
%20Seized%20Goods%20Final.pdf.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1.
92. Petition for Release of Seized Goods, supra note 88, at 1.
93. Verified Amended Complaint, at 12–13, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, (No. 11 CV.
4139, 2012 WL 2869487 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (this metric service functions similar to that of the
traditional Nielsen television ratings service, by measuring the amount of visitors relative to other
websites on the Internet).
94. Id.
95. Id. (Compete.com, a web page analytics service, calculated that Rojadirecta.org went from
44,623 to 96,986 monthly unique viewers from February to December 2010 while Rojadirecta.com
increased from 67,476 to 99,316 monthly unique viewers from February to November 2010).
96. Id. at 8. “Linking websites generally collect and catalog links to files on third-party websites
that contain illegal copies of copyrighted content.” Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 9.
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several groupings of links for viewing, including “‘Today On Internet TV’ . . .
‘Download Last Full Matches’ . . . and ‘Last Video Highlights.’”98 These
groupings include links to a wide range of sporting events including tennis,
basketball, baseball, hockey, college athletics, cricket, rugby, and
soccer/football.99
The United States government, through the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) investigative agency known as U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE),100 began seizing 150 domain names of
commercial websites “engaged in the illegal sale and distribution of counterfeit
goods and copyrighted works” in November 2011.101 This operation, together
with the Department of Justice, FBI, and the ICE-led National Intellectual
Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) was known as “Operation In
Our Sites.”102 Among the websites seized by ICE were rojadirecta.org and
rojadirecta.com.103 On January 31, 2011, the U.S. government seized both
domains and shortly after filed for the forfeiture of those same web addresses.104
Puerto 80 petitioned for the release of the seized domain names, but was
able to maintain the use of foreign domain names such as rojadirecta.me.105
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), together with the Center for
Democracy and Technology and Public Knowledge, filed an amicus brief
supporting Puerto 80.106 But in August 2011, United States District Court
Judge Paul Crotty denied Puerto 80’s petition, arguing that the seizure of the
domain names did not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution.107
Judge Crotty disputed the Puerto 80’s allegations that, “in seizing the domain
names, the [g]overnment has suppressed the content in the ‘forums’ on its

98. Id. at 10.
99. See generally ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1.
100. See generally Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2014).
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FEDERAL COURTS ORDER SEIZURE OF 150 WEBSITE DOMAINS
INVOLVED IN SELLING COUNTERFEIT GOODS AS PART OF DOJ, ICE HSI AND FBI CYBER MONDAY
CRACKDOWN (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-ag-1540.html.
102. See id.
103. See Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 93, at 1.
104. ROJADIRECTA, The U.S. Government withdraws complaint against the Rojadirecta
domains and the Court orders their return, ROJADIRECTA BLOG, (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://blog.rojadirecta.me/.
105. See generally Petition for Release of Seized Goods, supra note 88. See also Nate
Anderson, Government admits defeat, gives back seized Rojadirecta domains, ARS TECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/government-goes-0-2-admits-defeat-in-rojadirectadomain-forfeit-case/.
106. Ernesto, Domain Seizures Do Not Violate Free Speech, U.S. Court Rules, TORRENT
FREAK, http://torrentfreak.com/domain-seizures-does-not-violate-free-speech-110805/.
107. Id.
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websites. . . . The main purpose of the Rojadirecta websites, however, is to
catalog links to the copyrighted athletic events—any argument to the contrary
is clearly disingenuous.”108 Additionally, he held that the burden of the seizures
was not too impactful, as the alternative foreign domains were still available,
even to those who may not have known of the seizures.109
Despite the Southern District of New York ruling on the matter, almost
nineteen months after the domain names were seized, the United States
government withdrew its complaint and the court ordered their return.110 Dated
August 29, 2012, the dismissal letter does not offer a rationale as to why the
government dropped the forfeiture case.111 One proposed rationale for the
withdrawal is the government’s inability to prosecute Puerto 80 for criminal
infringement.112 The distinction rests with two problems in the case. The first
problem is that, in order to obtain the government’s desired forfeiture result,
Puerto 80 would have to be found liable for § 506 criminal copyright
infringement.113 § 506 states that “[a]ny person who willfully infringes a
copyright . . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”
will be held criminally liable.114 Importantly, the specific wording of the statute
provides criminal liability only for direct infringers. Nowhere in § 506 does
secondary liability for copyright infringement apply. The related second
problem is that Puerto 80 did not copy anything.115 “[H]yperlinking per se does
not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying. . . .”116
Nevertheless, no substantive ruling was made regarding secondary liability for
service providers.

108. Order at 4, United States v. Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U., No. 11 Civ. 4139 (S.D.N.Y Aug.
4, 2011).
109. See id at 3.
110. The U.S. Government withdraws complaint against the Rojadirecta domains and the Court
orders their return, ROJADIRECTA (BLOG), http://blog.rojadirecta.me/.
111. See Re: United States of America v. Rojadireca.org, et al. Letter of dismissal. (August 29,
2012).
112. See generally Mike Masnick, Rojadirecta Argues That The Justice Department Is Making
Up Laws; Has No Legal Basis To Forfeit Its Domain, TECHDIRT, (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:42 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110806/00013915420/rojadirecta-argues-that-justice-department
-is-making-up-laws-has-no-legal-basis-to-forfeit-its-domain.shtml.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
114. Id. § 506(a)(1)(A).
115. Mike Masnick, Rojadirecta Argues That The Justice Department Is Making Up Laws; Has
No Legal Basis To Forfeit Its Domain, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:42 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110806/00013915420/rojadirecta-argues-that-justice-department
-is-making-up-laws-has-no-legal-basis-to-forfeit-its-domain.shtml.
116. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1202 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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B. The myVidster Case: Flava Works v. Gunter
Flava Works, Inc., an adult entertainment company based in Miami,
Florida,117 “specializes in the production and distribution of videos of black
men engaged in homosexual acts.”118 Neither the court nor the defendant
contended that the videos produced by Flava Works were illegal or counter to
any obscenity law.119 In order to legally access Flava Works’ videos, the user
must first pay an upfront fee or “pay wall” and agree “not to copy, transmit,
sell, etc. the video.”120 Only paid subscribers are, however, able to download
the videos for “personal, noncommercial use.”121
myVidster is a “social video sharing and bookmarking site” that allows
users to “collect and share . . . videos [found] on the web.”122 It was created,
owned, and operated by Marques Rondale Gunter, who also owns the domain
name registration.123 Users are also able to browse and “follow video
collections from other users using myVidster.”124 Once a myVidster member
finds a video they wish to share, the user chooses whether to make the videos
available to other members.125 When a “bookmark” is received, myVidster then
“automatically requests the video’s ‘embed code’ from the server that
hosts . . . the video.”126 This “embed code” is used by the website to make the
video “appear to be on myVidster’s site.”127 The code takes the form of a
“thumbnail” that, when clicked, will connect the viewer’s computer to the
server, storing the file and playing the video.128 While it may appear the video
is on the myVidster website, the viewer is actually watching the video straight
from the server storing the file.129 The “frame” surrounding the videos contains
advertisements that help myVidster pay for its services.130 The “bookmarked”
117. Complaint at 3, Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter (2010) (No. 11-3190), available at
http://flavaworks.com/legal/files/10%2010%2012%20Myvidster%20Complaint.pdf.
118. Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 756. The court spends a bit of time discussing obscenity. Id. Stating that
“[a]cceptance of an obscenity defense would fragment copyright enforcement, protecting registered
materials in a certain community while . . . authorizing pirating in another locale.” Id. “In pari delicto”
is then raised as a potential question, but quickly dismissed. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Flava Works’ terms of use).
121. Id. (quoting Flava Works’ terms of use).
122. Frequently Asked Questions, MYVIDSTER, http://www.myvidster.com/docs/help (last
visited Feb. 27, 2014).
123. See Complaint supra note 117, at 4.
124. Id. at 19.
125. See 689 F.3d at 756.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (the “thumbnail” is a small picture or screen shot of the video for display purposes).
129. See id.
130. See id.
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video is not hosted on myVidster’s website.131
Flava Works filed for and was granted a preliminary injunction for
copyright infringement by the district court against myVidster.132 Several
businesses filed amicus briefs in the Seventh Circuit alongside Flava Works,
including the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Google, and
Facebook.133 But Judge Posner, however, found the district court erred in
granting the injunction. Drawing precedent from eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,134 a patents case, Judge Posner held that likelihood of success is not the
sole requirement for granting an injunction.135 Likelihood of success, however,
was the only requirement discussed in the district court’s decision, and so Judge
Posner restricted his procedural focus there.136
The stakes were high for ISPs. myVidster had responded to § 512(i)
takedown notices, but “[went] no further.”137 The EFF filed an amicus brief
claiming that “[c]ourts have emphasized that . . . § 512(i) does not create any
duty on the part of service providers to police their sites or otherwise make
determinations on claims of copyright infringement.”138 Judge Posner’s ruling
on the contributory negligence claims could have dramatically impacted
existing case law on “inline links” and even the “server test.”139
Judge Posner reversed the district court opinion and found in favor of
myVidster on several grounds related to the contributory infringement claims.
Though myVidster is “not just adding a frame around the video screen that the
visitor is watching,” so long as the viewer of the video does not make a copy
131. See id.
132. Id at 754. (the finding by the district judge was that a trier of fact would likely find
myVidster to be a contributory infringer).
133. Eriq Gardner, MPAA Lines Up with Porn Studio in Steamy Copyright Dispute, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/mpaaflava-works-myvidster-google-facebook-309595. Google and Facebook in particular were alarmed by
the district court’s treatment of social bookmarking websites as direct infringers. If myVidster’s
preliminary injunction were to remain, the impact on licensing and Internet business would be severe.
See id.
134. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
135. See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 755 (citing Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F. 3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (supporting the Court’s conclusion
that the eBay standard for preliminary injunctions can apply to a copyright case as well)).
136. See Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 755.
137. Gardner, supra note 133; See also Complaint, supra note 117.
138. Gardner, supra note 133.
139. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing the reality of how the internet worked, the Ninth Circuit struck a balance between
communication dissemination and copyright interests by deciding Google never really hosts the images
and thus cannot be a direct infringer); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001) (defendant Corley claims “inline linking” is not trafficking or distributing files, but
merely information as to where information is located).
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of the video, the viewer is “not violating the copyright owner’s exclusive
right . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”140 Judge Posner then
made the analogy of a viewer of an infringing video to an individual who steals
a copyrighted book from a library to read it.141 Both are “bad thing[s] to
do . . . but it is not copyright infringement.”142
Judge Posner specifically addressed the safe harbor provisions of § 512(d),
but then dismissed their applicability rather quickly as “myVidster is not an
infringer, at least in the form of copying or distributing copies of copyrighted
work.”143 The court’s response was that there was no evidence that myVidster
encouraged the infringers to upload the videos.144 If myVidster had invited or
induced the infringers to upload what it knew to be copyrighted material, then
the website would be liable for contributory infringement.145 But the court
found no evidence to this point. “myVidster knows that some of the videos
bookmarked on its site infringe copyright, but that doesn’t make it a facilitator
of copying.”146 Viewers of the infringing material were not paying for the right
to do so, and were “therefore not encouraging infringement.”147 Judge Posner
did posit that the DMCA does refer to linking users to locations with infringing
material and the possibility that it could expand the definition of contributory
copyright infringement.148 But again, he granted that Congress likely intended
to make the safe harbor provisions of § 512 “as capacious as possible” in order
to help ISPs avoid undue liability.149
C. Do They Qualify for the Information Location Tools Exemption?
In order to determine whether either Rojadirecta or myVidster qualify for
the § 512(d) safe harbor exemption for information location tools, an ISP must
first satisfy whether the infringing service meets its statutory definition.
According to § 512(d) and supported by the corresponding second part of
House Report NO. 105-551, an information location tool can be:
[A] directory of on-line sites or material, such as a search engine that
140.
106(1)(3)).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
(2005).
146.
147.
148.
149.

Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.; See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 930
Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 759.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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identifies pages by specified criteria; reference to other on-line material,
such as a list of recommended sites; a pointer that stands for Internet
locations or addresses; and hypertext link, which allows users to access
material without entering its address.150
Each of the websites in question meets the structural characteristics of an
information location tool. Rojadirecta is largely two components, both which
would qualify as an information location tool. The first is an online forum with
message boards for users to register, comment, and share links to live sporting
events.151 This directory or index provides user imputed lists of recommended
sites. The second is the hotlinks section on the home page.152 As the name
suggests, these are direct hypertext links to upcoming live events. Similarly,
myVidster is a website structured with links to view videos.153 The site is
organized into “collections,” which are user homepages with bookmarked, inline links to the desired videos. The website also has a search function,
allowing the user to search across myVidster, within a given collection or for a
particular user or group. Followers are listed on the right-hand side of the page.
But just because an ISP meets the structural requirements necessary to
classify as an information location tool does not mean the ISPs can obtain safe
harbor protection under § 512(d). myVidster, for instance, would more than
likely maintain its § 512(d) safe harbor protection. The website is primarily a
“user-community and it is not the website’s sole purpose to link to copyrighted
material.”154 Therefore, it may qualify for § 512(d) statutory immunity,
provided of course, that it responds expeditiously to takedown requests sent to
the ISP.155 The website, while obviously recognizing that copyright
infringement is possible on its site, has a structure that allows for copyright
owners to not only search and find their work, but also to easily report
infringement via a link at the bottom of the page.156 Provided that myVidster
either does not have actual knowledge of a specific infringement or fails to act
in a timely manner to remove or disable the material, the ISP is likely protected
from contributory copyright infringement.
myVidster must overcome two hurdles in order to feel confident in its safe
150. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, p 56–57 (1998).
151. ROJADIRECTA, Forum, http://forum.rojadirecta.es/forum.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
152. See ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1.
153. See MYVIDSTER, supra note 2.
154. Jason J. Lunardi, Note, Guerilla Video: Potential Copyright Liability for Websites That
Index Links to Unauthorized Streaming Content, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J.
1077, 1124 (2009).
155. Id. at 1125.
156. See MYVIDSTER, Copyright Complaints, http://www.myvidster.com/docs/copyright (last
visited Feb. 27, 2014).
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harbor protection. The first is the red flag knowledge provision of §
512(d)(1)(B). As was covered earlier, mere knowledge that infringement may
be occurring is neither constructive nor specific enough to cause myVidster to
become “subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”157 The second
hurdle, while not an emphasis of this Comment, is § 512(d)(2), the “financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”158 Advertisements
accompany each page where a video is displayed. Without the advertisements,
myVidster’s financial structure would be radically different. Is the sale of the
advertisements alongside videos, many of which are owned by the collection
owner, enough to remove § 512(d) protection? That appears unlikely,
especially considering YouTube’s success in overcoming § 512(c) challenges
using a similar business model. Paired with any failures to implement
takedown notices or red flag knowledge violations, myVidster could incur
problems.
Rojadirecta, however, runs into more substantive issues in obtaining §
512(d) protection. Every link provided on their main page and many of the
ones in the forums connect users to live copyrighted broadcasts of sporting
events. Unlike myVidster, which has a substantial volume of in-line linking to
either user’s personal videos or non-copyrighted media, the very intention of
Rojadirecta is to provide free access to otherwise unavailable copyrighted
broadcasts. If Rojadirecta were to receive and process every takedown it could
receive, the site would likely be devoid of content. Indeed, not only would
Rojadirecta fail the actual knowledge provision, but it would likely fail the red
flag knowledge provisions as well. With enough recurring broadcasts, it would
be objectively obvious to a reasonable person that Rojadirecta was aware of
circumstances leading to contributory copyright infringement. Rojadirecta
would almost certainly fail both the subjective actual knowledge component
and the objective red flag knowledge provision.
Working in Rojadirecta’s favor, however, might be the lack of a “financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.”159 The website is a free
forum devoid of advertising. The only corporate connections are links to “like”
Rojadirecta on Facebook or to follow on Twitter.160 In fact, at the bottom of
the Rojadirecta home page, there is a Creative Commons icon, which informs
the user of what is permissible.161 It requires that all works must be attributed,
157. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2) (2006).
159. Id.
160. See ROJADIRECTA, supra note 1.
161. See
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.en (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). Of particular
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not used for commercial purposes, and cannot be altered in any way.162 In short,
Rojadirecta might be able to qualify for § 512 immunity, but it would have a
much harder path towards qualifying as an information location tool.
Rojadirecta represents a gray area in § 512(d) precisely because it fails the
knowledge components, but also fails to satisfy other traditionally glaring
infringement red flags like financial incentives. Should Rojadirecta have ever
reached litigation, and not remained an ICE civil forfeiture case, it may have
helped shape the outer of limits of § 512 exemptions.
CONCLUSION
§ 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act intended to provide
additional levels of certainty and protection to ISPs, in order to properly balance
the rights of copyright owners without either party sacrificing freedom of
speech. § 512(d) has the potential to provide too much latitude for websites
and ISPs that allow users to provide links for third parties to stream infringing
copyrightable material online. While the sites themselves may be shielded from
contributory, direct, or vicarious infringement, the fact remains that the ISPs,
while not willfully blind to their behavior of their users, should be cautious of
the knowledge requirements set forth in § 512(c)-(d), especially those regarding
actual knowledge and red flag knowledge, being subjectively aware of
infringements objectively obvious to the reasonable person.
Given the current case law surrounding websites such as YouTube, a model
resembling myVidster has a higher chance of being protected in court than the
more obvious Rojadirecta. § 512(d), due to its actual and red flag knowledge
provisions, gives a great deal of flexibility to ISPs in shielding themselves from
copyright infringement. Nevertheless, as case law evolves on the matter,
websites that, by their very nature, might potentially expose themselves to
copyright infringement must stay alert to the ever-changing legal
interpretations around them. While ISPs may have latitude using the safe
harbor exemptions, copyright owners, particularly broadcast and recording
studios with the financial wherewithal to pursue such claims, will surely
continue trying to narrow these exemptions to better protect their copyrighted
products.
KEVIN J. WLEKLINSKI*

note, Rojadirecta’s website features the “most restrictive of [the] six main licenses,” allowing others
the ability to download works and sharing them, provided users properly credit the source. This license
also restricts the ability to change the downloaded works in any way or use them commercially. About
the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
162. Id.
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